Enforcement of private food standards: A role for self-reporting of non-compliance?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v22i1.7354Keywords:
private food standards, compliance, self-reportingAbstract
Objective: to discuss the importance and effectiveness of private standards for the food industry. Private food standards are important, given they are set by private bodies, adopted and implemented by private firms, with enforcement conducted by third-parties. This leads to a key question: are there efficient mechanisms ensuring compliance with and enforcement of private standards? Methodology: application of law enforcement analysis to certification of private food standards, focusing on deterrence of non-compliance and incentives for self-reporting. Results: self-reporting lowers enforcement costs, encourages remediation if standards are not met, and reduces costly effort associated with avoidance of auditing. Limitations: private certification is well-documented, but empirical analysis of compliance is lacking. Originality: extension of analysis of self-reporting of non-compliance with standards to the threat of boycott. Conclusions: analysis of private certification of food standards needs to account for optimal auditing and enforcement strategies, and their associated costs.Downloads
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