Tariff De-escalation with successive oligopoly: Implications for developing country market access

Autores/as

  • Ian M. Sheldon Andersons Professor of International Trade, Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State University, USA.
  • Steve McCorriston Professor, Department of Economics, School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v6i1.98

Resumen

Sin resumen.

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Citas

Bulow, Jeremy I., John D. Geanakopolos, and Paul D. Klemperer (1985).“Multi-Market Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements”, Journal of Political Economy 93 (3), 488-511.

Francois, Joseph and Will Martin (2003). “Formula Approaches for Market Access Negotiations”, World Economy (26), 1-28.

McCorriston, Steve and Ian Sheldon (2009). “Tariff De-escalation with Successive Oligopoly”, unpublished working paper.

Sleuwaegen, Leo, René Belderbos, and Clive Jie-A-Joen (1998). “Cascading Contingent Protection and Vertical Market Structure”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16 (6), 697-718.

Spencer, Barbara J. and Ronald W. Jones (1991). “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy”, Review of Economic Studies 58 (4), 153-170.

World Bank (2003). Global Economic Prospects: Realizing the Development Promise of

The Doha Agenda, Washington, DC: World Bank.

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Publicado

2010-03-01

Cómo citar

Sheldon, I. M., & McCorriston, S. (2010). Tariff De-escalation with successive oligopoly: Implications for developing country market access. EconoQuantum, 6(1), 59–64. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v6i1.98

Número

Vol. 6 Núm. 1 Segundo Semestre 2009 Second Semester

Sección

Suplemento Especial

Licencia

El contenido publicado en EconoQuantum se encuentra bajo una Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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