Aplicación de normas alimentarias privadas: ¿un papel para autorreportar incumplimientos?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v22i1.7354Palabras clave:
normas alimentarias privadas, cumplimiento, autorreportarResumen
Objetivo: discutir la importancia y efectividad de las normas privadas para la industria alimentaria. Las normas alimentarias privadas son importantes, dado que son establecidas por organismos privados, adoptadas e implementadas por empresas privadas, y su aplicación está a cargo de terceros. Esto lleva a una pregunta clave: ¿existen mecanismos eficientes que garanticen el cumplimiento y la aplicación de las normas privadas? Metodología: análisis de la aplicación de la ley a la certificación de normas alimentarias privadas, centrándose en la disuasión del incumplimiento y los incentivos para autorreportar. Resultados: el autorreportar reduce los costos de aplicación, fomenta la remediación si no se cumplen las normas y reduce el costoso esfuerzo asociado con la evasión de la auditoría. Limitaciones: la certificación privada está bien documentada, pero falta un análisis empírico del cumplimiento. Originalidad: extensión del análisis de autorreporte del incumplimiento de las normas a la amenaza de boicot. Conclusiones: el análisis de la certificación privada de normas alimentarias debe tener en cuenta las estrategias óptimas de auditoría y aplicación, y sus costos asociados.Descargas
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