Climate policy and border tax adjustments: Might industrial organization matter?


  • Ian Sheldon Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics, Ohio State University
  • Steve McCorriston Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School



En este artículo se analiza el impacto de los ajustes de impuestos fronterizos sobre políticas públicas ambientales orientadas a las emisiones de carbón. Asimismo, se abordan temas de competitividad e industrias intensivas en energía.En comparación con la literatura relevante este trabajo se sitúa en un marco de un mercado integrado verticalmente bajo una estructura de oligopolio sucesivo. En particular, se muestra que un ajuste óptimo de impuestos fronterizos depende de las políticas ambientales locales, la naturaleza de la competencia entre las empresas proveedoras y compradores y de la forma cómo se defina la neutralidad de dicho ajuste. Los principales resultados de los ajustes de impuestos fronterizos son dos. Por un lado, si la neutralidad del comercio se define en términos de volumen de mercado, entonces la competitividad de las empresas domésticas no se puede mantener aunque las emisiones de carbón se reduzcan. Por el otro, si la neutralidad se define como la participación de mercado, entonces la competitividad se mantiene y las emisiones de carbón se reducen. En ambos casos se incurre en pérdidas sociales.


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Cómo citar

Sheldon, I., & McCorriston, S. (2012). Climate policy and border tax adjustments: Might industrial organization matter?. EconoQuantum, 9(2), 7–28.