A new solution for resource distribution based on levels and incentive allocation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.vi21i2.7319Abstract
Objective: this work aims to propose an alternative for distribution of incentives by levels. Methodology: distribution by levels is obtained through a simple linear regression between the distribution of incentives assigned to each agent and the amount demanded according to their level in the ladder structure. Results: the proposed solution manages to exactly distribute the available resource among all agents, presenting a simple and practical implementation. Three examples are included that illustrate the application of this new method, highlighting the differences as compared to both the usual and proportional distribution modes. Limitations: the simple linear regression used assumes a linear relationship between the level and incentives, which may not reflect the complexity of some organizational structures. Originality: the distribution solution developed in this work offers an interpretation in terms of individual performances, which expands its applicability to various areas. Conclusions: our distribution proposal acts as a mediator between the usual and proportional distributions. It is observed that the usual distribution favors the lowest performance levels, while the proportional distribution benefits the highest levels.Downloads
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