Vertical product differentiation and credence goods: Mandatory labeling and gains from international integration

  • Ian Sheldon The Ohio State University
  • Brian Roe The Ohio State University

Resumen

A través de un modelo vertical de diferenciación de productos se muestra el marco institucional que maximiza el bienestar cuando dos economías se integran comercialmente y coordinan sus políticas de etiquetado y certificación. En particular, se muestra que el etiquetado discreto, armonizado y obligatorio no maximiza ganancias. Por ejemplo, la elección del tipo de etiquetado puede tener un efecto negativo sobre la estructura de mercado si las empresas deciden salirse, reduciendo así el rango y la calidad de los bienes. Pero con reconocimiento mutuo de estándares de etiquetado existe una probabilidad más alta de ganancia.

Citas

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Publicado
2009-08-03
Cómo citar
Sheldon, I., & Roe, B. (2009). Vertical product differentiation and credence goods: Mandatory labeling and gains from international integration. EconoQuantum, 5(1), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v5i1.88