Simultaneous auctions of identical items by first-price close mechanism with a bonus for buyers
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v19i2.7270Keywords:
simultaneous auctions, first-price sealed mechanism, bayesian games, symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium, seller's expected revenueAbstract
Objective: In this paper we study, from the seller’s perspective, how to auction a finite set of identical items when the buyer who obtains the whole set of goods (if any) gets a bonus, such that the seller maximizes his expected revenue and taking into account the strategic behavior of the bidders. Methodology: We use Bayesian Games for modelling the situation considering a strategy space equal to R+m for each bidder. Results: We show a Symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium for the model as well as the seller’s indifference between several natural ways for offering the bonus to a bidder getting the whole set of items, because he obtains the same expected revenue. Limitations: The model regards only identical items. Originality: We show an equilibrium bid for a n-personal model of m Simultaneous Auctions under first-price close mechanism considering that there is a kind of extra profit. Conclusions: The seller is indifferent between several ways to offer the bonus. It could be interesting to contrast the theoretical results under an experimental framework.Downloads
References
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Copyright (c) 2022 Karla Flores-Zarur, William Olvera-Lopez
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