Party system and efficiency of public goods supply
a formal model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v17i2.7170Keywords:
Party system, government efficiency, clientelism, public goods provision.Abstract
Objective: To advance in a theoretical explanation about the effect of party systems and political competition on government performance, relative to the provision of public goods and clientelistc private goods. Methodology: I build and present a theoretical model to address the cited problem. Results: The model describes how the rise in the number of competing political parties encourages the clientelistic behavior of incumbents. Limitations: Despite the paper explains some known empirical facts, it does not present any empirical analysis and evidence. Originality: The paper presents an original formal model based on the government employment to analyze the effect that the party system has over government performance. Conclusion: The main result shows that the increase in the number of parties within the system, diminishes public goods delivers and encourages clientelistic expenditures. Recepción: 10/04/2019 Aceptación: 04/12/2019Downloads
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