Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un análisis formal

  • Leonardo Adalberto Gatica Arreola Universidad de Guadalajara, CUCEA
Palabras clave: Sistema de partidos, eficiencia gubernamental, clientelismo, provisión

Resumen

Objetivo: Avanzar en una explicación teórica sobre el efecto que tiene el sistema de partidos sobre el uso eficiente de los recursos públicos, particularmente sobre el uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental. Metodología: Se desarrolla un modelo formal para abordar el problema antes descrito. Resultados: Se presenta un modelo formal que logra capturar cómo el incremento del número de partidos políticos que compiten en una economía incentiva un mayor uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental. Limitaciones: Si bien este trabajo busca explicar los resultados de otros análisis empíricos y avanzar en términos teóricos, únicamente presenta un modelo formal sin aportar evidencia empírica. Originalidad: A saber del autor, hasta la fecha no hay en la literatura un modelo teórico que, enfocado en el uso del empleo gubernamental, explique los efectos que el sistema de partidos puede tener en el empleo clientelar de los recursos públicos. Conclusiones: El modelo explica como la presencia de un mayor número de partidos genera nuevos grupos de votantes políticamente rentables, que pueden ser capturados por el partido en el gobierno mediante el ofrecimiento de empleo burocrático.

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Publicado
2020-06-29
Cómo citar
Gatica Arreola, L. (2020). Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un análisis formal. EconoQuantum, 17(2), 33-56. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v17i2.7170