Do Developing Countries Benefit from Antidumping Laws? An Assessment Based upon a Theoretical Dumping Model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v2i1.166Resumen
Este ensayo desarrolla un modelo de dumping internacional bajo mercados de competencia imperfecta donde las empresas explotan sus ventajas comparativas. El análisis de estática comparativa sugiere, primero, que bajo libre comercio y una política de competencia coordinada un producto con dumping puede aumentar el bienestar económico para el país importador bajo diversas estructuras de mercado de dichos productos. Estos beneficios surgen de precios importados más bajos y de un aumento de la competencia en el mercado doméstico. Segundo, en ausencia de estas políticas de competencia coordinadas entre países, el comercio de productos con dumping cuando los mercados de los productos son de competencia imperfecta sí puede producir pérdidas para el país importador. Tercero, el análisis de bienestar de instrumentos compensatorios al dumping indica que dichas medidas comerciales son las menos convenientes para el país importador. La mejor política es libre comercio acompañada de una política de competencia coordinada entre países. Cuarto, el modelo en adición permite identificar instrumentos alternativos que mejoran el bienestar del país importador de bienes comerciados con dumping.Descargas
Citas
Anderson, J. (1992) “Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters”, American Economic Review, No. 82, pp. 65-83.
—— (1993) “Domino Dumping II: Antidumping”, Journal of International Economics, No. 35, pp. 133-150.
Brander, J., and B. Spencer (1984) “Tariff Protection under Imperfect Competition”, in H. Kierkowski (ed), Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, Clarendon Press.
Clarida, R. (1993) “Entry, Dumping and Shakeout”, American Economic Review, No. 83, pp. 180-202.
Collie, D. (1991) “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly: A Comment”, European Economic Review, No. 35, pp. 1185-1187.
Davies, S., and A., McGuiness (1982) “Dumping at Less than Marginal Cost”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 12, pp. 169-182.
Dixit, A. (1988) “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly”, European Economic Review, No. 32, p. 55-68.
Eichengreen, B., and H. Van der Ven (1984) “US Antidumping Policies: The case of Steel”, in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger (eds), The Structure and Evolution of recent US Trade Policy, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Ethier, W. (1982) “Dumping”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 487-506.
Finger, M. (1992) “Dumping and Antidumping: The Rhetoric and the Reality of Protection in Industrial Countries”, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 7, No. 2, July, pp. 121-144.
—— (1993) Antidumping How It Works and Who Gets Hurt?, University of Michigan, Michigan. Friedman, J. (1978) Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North Holland.
Gallaway, M., B. Blonigen, and J. Flynn (1999) “Welfare Cost of the US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws”, Journal of International Economics, No. 49, pp. 211-244.
Greenaway, D., and J. Whalley (1998) “Symposium-Competition Policy in a Global Economy”, The World Economy, vol. 21, No. 8, November.
Gruenspecht, H. (1988) “Dumping and Dynamic Competition”, Journal International Economics, No. 25, pp. 225-248.
Guasch, J., and S. Rajapatirana (1998) Antidumping and Competition Policies in Latin America and Caribbean: Total Strangers or Soul Mates, World Bank, April, mimeo.
Gupta, P. (1997) Strategic Behavior of the Exporter in the Presence of Antidumping Regulation, University of Maryland, mimeo.
Hahn, F. (1962) “The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 32, No. 81, pp. 329-331.
Harberger, A. (1954) “Monopoly and Resource Allocation”, The American Economic Review, vol. 44, No. 2, May, pp. 77-87.
Harberler, G. (1937) The Theory of International Trade with Its Applicationsto commercial Policy, MacMillan, New York.
Hoekman, B., and P. Holmes (1999) “Competition Policy, DevelopingCountries and the wto”, The World Economy, No. 22, pp. 875-893.
Horlick, G., and S. Sugarman (1999) “Antidumping Policy as a System of Law”, Chapter 14 in Rodriguez-Low-Kotschwar (eds).
Jacquemin, A., P. J. Lloyd, P. Tharakan, and J. Waelbroeck (1998) “Competition Policy in an International Setting”, The World Economy, vol. 21, No. 8, November, pp. 1179-1184.
Krishna, R. (1997) Anti-Dumping in Law and Practice, World Bank, mimeo.
Krueger, A. (1978) Foreign Trade Regime and Economic Development: Liberalization Attempts and Consequences.
Krugman, P., and J. Brander (1983) “A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade”, Journal of International Economics, No. 15, pp. 313-321.
Kurdle, R. (1974) “A Reverse Dumping Duty for Canada”, Canadian Journal of Economics, No. 7, pp. 75-81.
Lahiri, S., and J. Sheen (1990) “On Optimal Dumping”, The Economic Journal, No. 100, pp. 127-136.
Lawrence, R. (1998) Brooking Trade Forum 1998, Brooking Institution.
Little-Scitovsky-Scott (1970) Industry and Trade in Some Development Countries, Oxford.
Lloyd, P. (1998) “¿Multilateral Rules for Competition Law?”, The World Economy, vol. 21, No. 8, November, pp. 1129-1150.
Löfgren, K. (1977) “Dumping, Devaluation, and Monopoly Prices: A
Generalization of Yntema’s Results”, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze
Economiche e Commerciali, No. 24, August, pp. 658-667.
Martin, S., (1999) “Trade and Competition: An Industrial Economist Perspective”, World Economy, vol. 22, No. 6, August, pp. 895-907.
Miranda, J., R. Torres, and M. Ruiz (1998) “The International Use of Antidumping: 1987-1997”, Journal of World Trade, vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 5-71.
Morkre, M., and K. Kelly (1994) “Effects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industries: US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 1980-1988”, US Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics and Staff Report, US Federal Trade Commission. Washington, D.C.
Murray, T., and D. Rousslang (1989) “A Method for estimating Injury Caused by Unfair Trade Practices”, International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 9, No. 99, pp. 149-164.
Niels, G. (2000) “What is Antidumping Policy Really About?”, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 467-492.
Ordover, J, and G. Saloner (1989) “Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust”, In Schmanlensee-Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, North Holland.
Panagariya, A., and P. Gupta (1998) “Antidumping Duty vs. Price Negotiations”, The World Economy, vol. 21, No. 8, November, pp. 1003- 1020.
Philips, L. (1983) The Economics of Price Discrimination, Cambridge University Press.
Prusa, T. (1992) “Why Are so Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?”, Journal International Economics, No. 33, pp. 1-20.
—— (1994) “Pricing Behavior in the presence of antidumping law”, Journal of Economic Integration, No. 9, pp. 260-289.
—— (2005) “The Growing Problem of Antidumping Protection”, in Ito-Rose (eds.), International Trade in East Asia, The University of Chicago, nber series.
Quirmbach, H. (1988) “Comparative Static for Oligopoly: Demand Shift Effects”, International Economic Review, vol. 29, pp. 451-459.
Robinson, J. (1933) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, MacMillan, London.
Rodriguez, M., P. Low, and B. Kotschwar (eds.) (1999) Trade Rules in the Making. Brooking Institution Press, oea.
Russell, B. (1999) “How Long Can You Tread Water? The Anti-Economics of Trade-Remedy Law”, Chapter 13 in Rodriguez-Low- Kotschwar (eds).
Schmanlensee, R., and R. Willig (1989) Handbook of Industrial Organization, North Holland.
Schmitt-Anderson-Thisse (1995) “Who Benefits from Antidumping Legislation?”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 38, No. 3-4, pp. 321-337. Also in Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics, dp-No. 92-12, Canada.
Seade, J. (1980) “The Stability of Cournot Revisited”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 23, No. 1, August, pp. 15-27.
Slesnick, D. (1998) “Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. xxxvi, No. 4, December, pp. 2108-2165.
Staiger, R., and F. Wolak (1992) “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolist”, Journal International Economics, No. 32, pp. 265-87.
—— (1994) “Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 51-118.
Stiglitz, J. (1997) “Dumping on Free Trade: The US Import Trade Laws”, Southern Economic Journal, No. 64, October, pp. 402-424.
Tello, M. D. (1993) Mecanismos hacia el crecimiento económico: el enfoque de la organización industrial en el sector manufacturero peruano, 1970-1987, pucp/Consorcio idrc.
—— (1995) “¿Puede el proteccionismo promover las exportaciones?: el caso de las economías de diversificación en los países en desarrollo”, Revista Española de Economía.
—— (1997) “Hacia una estrategia de promoción de exportaciones”, in Tyler-Tello (eds.), La promoción de exportaciones en Nicaragua, Nicaragua, usaid/mede.
Tello, M. D., A. Veiderpass, and A. Isgut (1999) “Microeconomic Adjustment under Structural Reforms: The Case of the Nicaraguan Manufacturing Sector, 1991-1995”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. xx, No. 3, pp. 545-566.
Varian, H. (1989) “Price Discrimination”, in Schamalensee-Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Chapter 10, vol. I, North Holland.
Viner, J. (1923) Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Willig, R. (1998) “The Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”, in R. Lawrence (ed.), Brookings Trade Forum 1998, Brooking Institution.
Yntema, T. (1928) “The Influence of Dumping on Monopoly Price”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 36, No. 6, December, pp. 686-98.
Descargas
Publicado
Cómo citar
Número
Sección
Licencia
El contenido publicado en EconoQuantum se encuentra bajo una Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
