Political contributions, subsidy and mergers


  • M. Ozgur Kayalica Department of Management Engineering, and Technology and Economic Development Research Center (TEDRC), Istanbul Technical University, Macka, Istanbul, Turkey
  • Rafael Salvador Espinosa Ramírez Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Guadalajara




A partir de un modelo oligopolístico de equilibrio parcial, modelamos los efectos de las fusiones y el cabildeo político doméstico para definir políticas nacionales de subsidio. Empresas locales y foráneas compiten en un mercado de bienes homogéneos en un país huésped de inversión. La producción óptima de las empresas va a depender de la política de subsidio. Las empresas locales ofrecen cabildear con contribuciones económicas al gobierno para afectar la decisión de política. El gobierno establece la política óptima maximizando el peso entre las contribuciones políticas y el bienestar social agregado, tomando en cuenta las fusiones que hacen las empresas locales como respuesta a la competencia foránea.


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Cómo citar

Ozgur Kayalica, M., & Espinosa Ramírez, R. S. (2012). Political contributions, subsidy and mergers. EconoQuantum, 9(2), 61–80. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v9i2.149