El análisis espacial de la competencia política y el problema de estabilidad

Autores/as

  • Leonardo Gatica Arreola Department of Economics, University of Guadalajara
  • Mauricio Ramírez Grajeda Department of Quantitative Methods, University of Guadalajara

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v3i2.2593

Palabras clave:

Teoría especial del voto, competencia política, inestabilidad en modelos espaciales de votación, elección pública, partidos políticos

Resumen

The design and implementation of public policies presented as platforms for political competition, and their relation with the polity preferences, are part of the issues that the Spatial Theory of Political Competition studies. The main theoretical developments to explain the positions taken by political competitors, in particular those related with the stability problem, are surveyed in this paper.

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Citas

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Publicado

2015-07-13

Cómo citar

Gatica Arreola, L., & Ramírez Grajeda, M. (2015). El análisis espacial de la competencia política y el problema de estabilidad. EconoQuantum, 3(2), 89–116. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v3i2.2593

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Vol. 3 Núm. 2 Primer Semestre 2007 First Semester

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Los autores ceden a EconoQuantum, Revista de Economía y Finanzas, los derechos de publicación y difusión de su trabajo titulado “_________________________________________”, tanto en medios impresos como digitales.

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